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First-past-the-post elections in single-member districts make legislators more
accountable to their district of election compared to proportional electoral sys-
tems. Accountability makes politicians more sensitive to voters’ preferences
when deciding where and how to allocate public expenditure, and also reduces
rent extraction. On the other hand, first-past-the-post elections generate over-
representation of majority parties in parliament, potentially hurting minorities
and democratic legitimacy. The mixed system used for Italian Senate elections
in 1994, 1996 and 2001 mitigates this tradeoff: 3/4 of the seats are assigned to
winners in single-member district elections (majoritarian tier), while the rest to
the best runners-up based on party-level vote counts (proportional tier). The
system mechanically compensates opposition parties, while keeping all legisla-
tors equally accountable to their district. In fact, our empirical analysis based
on close elections does not find significative differences in targeting of legislative
activity to the district, and in absenteeism between senators of different tiers,
contrary to what other studies find for mixed systems with two separate ballot
lists.
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The two most common electoral systems worldwide are: plurality elections in single-
member districts (common in English-speaking countries), and proportional repre-
sentation in multi-seat constituencies (common in European countries1). Existing
research has found that adopting one or the other has effects on political represen-
tation, economic policy outcomes, and legislators’ incentives.2 Politicians elected in
single-member districts are more visible and thus accountable to their constituency.
As such, they have more incentives to focus their legislative activity on issues im-
portant for their district. This in turn affects the composition of public spending in
favour of local public goods and geographically targeted transfers, at the expense of
national public goods and broad redistribution.3 Furthermore, higher accountability
makes harder for politicians to extract rents (e.g. in the form of shirking, corruption,
or clientelism). On the other hand, systems with single-member districts mechanically
result in overrepresentation of large parties relative to their vote shares (winner-take-
all rule), and thus penalize smaller parties and political representation. Scholars in
electoral engineering thus recognize that the choice of electoral systems necessarely
involves some tradeoffs, some of which are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Some posited tradeoffs between outcomes: plurality versus proportional rules.
Plurality elections in single-seat constituencies Proportional representation in multiseat constituencies
Single-party governments: Coalition governments with several political parties:
decisive outcomes and greater government accountability representation of the entire spectrum of political views
direct accountability of individual politicians to their constituents stronger and more cohesive political parties
greater political stability higher ideological congruence between government and citizens
fewer ideological extremists in parliament proportionality of seats and votes
lower budget deficits enhanced representation of women and racial and ethnic minorities
lower taxes higher public spending and more public goods and services
lower economic inequality
Source: Grofman (2016). Note: Bold emphasis added.
In this paper, I analyze empirically how the unique hybrid electoral system in
place in the Italian Senate (Senato della Repubblica) between 1994 and 2001 affects
legislators’ behaviour in two dimensions: geographical targeting of their legislative
1E.g. Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Spain.
2See Section 1.1 for a literature review.
3The welfare implications of targeting legislative activity to specific geographical constituencies is
ambiguos, and depends on how local public goods are valuable relative to national ones.
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activity, and abstenteeism. My findings suggest that this system mitigates one of
the most important tradeoffs between the two systems above (in bold in Table 1):
it corrects downward the overrepresentation of the majority, while keeping legislators
accountable, and focused on their electoral district in terms of legislative activity.
The system assigns 3/4 of the seats to winners in single-member district races. The
remaining seats are assigned according to proportional representation. Unlike other
mixed systems, most notably the one used in the Italian House (Camera dei Deputati)
in the same period, in the German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag), and in both
Italian House and Senate since 2018, the remaining seats are not assigned among can-
didates in a separate list, but among runners-up from the single-district races. Thus,
on one hand the assignment mechanism mechanically reduces the overrepresentation
of the party with more district winners (the majority party) by assigning the extra
seats to minority parties, that is those with less district winners. On the other hand,
both types of elected legislators (winners and runners-up) have gone through the ex-
act same electoral competition, and have endured the same visibility in the eyes of a
well defined geographical constituency. As such, we can expect the two types to be
equally accountable, and thus to not behave differently in terms of targeting legislative
activity, and shirking.
To test this hypothesis, I rely on a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) which
exploits close elections between winners and runners-up, who both result elected in
the Senate. Using micro data at the legislator level on absenteeism rate and on the
share of sponsored bills targeted to their state of election, I do not find significant
differences between winners and runners-up. My findings are particularly meaningful
when compared to the evidence in a related work by Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and
Naticchioni (2011), who analyse behaviour of members of the Italian House in the same
period. At the time, the House also had a mixed electoral system that, contrary to the
Senate, featured two completely separate tiers with separate ballots and candidates:
one with single-member districts, the other with proportional representation in closed
lists. Exploiting close elections and the fact that candidates could run for both tiers,
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Gagliarducci et al. (2011) find that legislators elected in single-member districts target
more their legislative activity to the district of election, and show lower abstenteeism,
as compared to their colleagues elected under closed-list proportional rule in the other
tier. Using data from the same source and a very similar empirical strategy, I do not
find the same differences between winners and runners-up in the Senate.
My findings are informative for policy-makers interested in designing an electoral
system which guarantees (somewhat) proportional representation of parties in parlia-
ment, while keeping its members accountable to a specific geographic constituency.
Compared to a standard single-member majoritarian system, the mixed system in
place in the Italian Senate between 1994 and 2001 generates a seat distribution more
proportional to the underlying vote distribution. At the same time, it keeps all legisla-
tors equally accountable and visible to their constituents, contrary to what happens in
mixed systems made of two majoritarian and proportional tiers with separate ballots.
1.1 Literature
The present paper contributes to the literature on comparative electoral systems, es-
pecially to the stream analysing differences between proportional and majoritarian
systems. The theoretical literature has used different political economic models to
analyize the impact of these systems on the provision of broad versus targeted public
goods (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti,
and Rostagno, 2002). Despite differences in modelling choices, these papers share the
prediction that majoritarian systems result in more targeted public spending, and in
lower expenditure in broad public goods. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002)
and Funk and Gathmann (2013) find evidence consistent with this prediction using,
respectively, a panel of countries and of Swiss cantons. The model by Persson and
Tabellini (2000) also predicts that politicians elected in majoritarian system extract
less rents than those elected in proportional systems. Using a different model, Myerson
(1999) shows that this prediction holds true only if the greater accountability of the
majoritarian system more than compensates the fact that proportional systems have
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lower entry-barrier for honest politicians.
More recently economists have exploited the existence of mixed systems with a
majoritarian and a proportional tier to test the predictions above. Gagliarducci et al.
(2011) are the first to provide causal evidence on the effect of majoritarian electoral
system relative to proportional system using politician-level data. As discussed in
the introduction, they exploit the mixed system of the Italian House in the period
1994-2001, which featured two separate tiers with separate ballots. Using an RDD
based on close elections, they find that politicians elected in single-member districts
(majoritarian tier) target more their legislative activity to the district of election, and
show lower abstenteeism, as compared to their colleagues elected under closed-list
proportional rule (proportional tier). The estimated effect are quite large (30% for
abstenteeism, 100% for targeting). Maaser and Stratmann (2018) analyse politicians’
behaviour in German state parliaments, whose electoral systems featured two separate
tiers with different lists. They find that politicians elected in first-past-the-post elec-
tions are more likely to be members of parliamentary committees which are crucial for
targeted redistribution. Other papers exploit laws mandating different systems for mu-
nicipalities above or below certain population threshold. Pellicer and Wegner (2013)
compare single-member districts to proportional representation in closed list elections
in Morocco, and find that the former favor clientelistic parties over programmatic par-
ties. Eggers (2015) compares at-large elections with plurality voting to proportional
representation with majority bonus in France, and finds turnout higher in the latter.
Very recently Albanese, Cioffi, and Tommasino (2019) have analyzed legislators’ be-
haviour in the Italian Senate following the reform from the system analyzed in the
present paper to a closed-list proportional system. They find that legislative targeting
to districts, and legislative effort both drop after the reform.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the details of
the electoral rules in the Italian Senate and House in the period under consideration;
Section 3 lays out the research question and the identification strategy; Section 4
presents the empirical findings; finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Italian two-tier electoral system
Italy is a parliamentary democracy. The parliament is composed of two chambers: the
House and the Senate. The two chambers differ in size, and in the eligibility criteria to
elect and to be elected. The 630 House members must be at least 25 years old, and are
elected by voters older than 18 years old; the 315 Senators must be at least 40 years old
and are elected by voters older than 25 years old. The two chambers of parliament have
the same political powers. In particular, legislative bills must be approved separately
by both chambers, and the government must win a vote of confidence separately in
both chambers. Elections to choose members of the two chambers have always been
held on the same day, although in principle scattered elections are possible. All the
features described so far are prescribed by the Constitution, and have not been revised
since its adoption in 1946. On the contrary, electoral rules for the parliament do not
have constitutional rank, and have changed frequently over time. The focus of the
present paper is on the electoral system in place during the XII (1994-1996), XIII
(1996-2001) and XIV (2001-2006) legislatures. In this period the electoral rule differed
across the House and the Senate, but members of both chambers were elected under
a two-tier system. Candidates running for a seat in the House were forbidden to run
for the Senate, and vice versa.
Electoral rule in the Senate According to the electoral rule, the country was
divided in 232 single-member districts. Voters received only one ballot for the Senate
to cast one vote for one candidate in their single-member district. Each party might
field at most one candidate in each of the 232 districts. Out of the total 315 seats,
232 were assigned to the candidates who received the most votes in their district (first
place finishers). Furthermore, 83 additional seats were assigned to some runners-up4
according to a peculiar proportional rule, designed to partly compensate opposition
parties. According to this rule, popular votes at the the state5 level for each party
4I adopt the definition of “runner-up” by the Merriam-Webster dictionary: “the competitor that
does not win first place in a contest”. Thus the definition is not restricted to second place finishers.
5The 20 states (Regioni) are the highest-order level of sub-national government in the Italian
system.
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were calculated without considering the votes earned by the first-ranked candidates.
Available seats in each state were then allocated to parties proportionally to these
popular vote counts using the D’Hondt method. Within each party, the seats were
assigned to the runners-up who received the highest vote shares in their districts.
A simple example helps to clarify this complicated electoral rule. An exemplar
state is composed of three districts, and assigns three seats in the majoritarian tier,
and two in the proportional tier. In each district, four parties field candidates. The
absolute number of votes received by each candidate is reported in Table 2. The
three candidates who collect the highest number of votes in each district are elected
in the majoritarian tier (in bold in Table 2). The sums in the fifth column, Σlosers, are
calculated disregarding the votes obtained by the three winners. Based on the votes
collected by the losers, the D’Hondt method assigns one seats in the proportional tier
to the Liberals (Σlosers = 450), and one to the Republicans (Σlosers = 450).
6 The seat
of the Liberals is assigned to the candidate ranked second in district 3, as her vote
share (25%) is higher than those gained by her party colleagues in the other districts
(0% and 20%). The seat of the Republicans is assigned to the candidate ranked third
in district 1, as her vote share (25%) is higher than those gained by her party colleagues
in the other districts (0% and 20%).
Table 2: Electoral rule in the Senate: example
Party District 1 District 2 District 3 Σlosers 0.5×Σlosers
Democrats 450 200 500 200 100
Republicans 250 0 200 450 225
Liberals 0 200 250 450 225
Populists 300 600 50 350 175
Total 1000 1000 1000
Note: votes by party and district. In bold candidates elected as first place finishers
(majoritarian tier); in boxes candidates elected as runners-up (proportional tier).
Under this system, the first ranked candidates own their election only to their
performance in the district. On the contrary, elected in the proportional tier own their
6The D’Hondt method to allocate x seats works as follows. The sum of the losers in each party,
Σlosers, are divided by the integers between 1 and x. Then, the x highest of these quotients receive
a seat. In the example x = 2, and the quotients are reported in the last two columns of Table 2.
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election to the overall party performance at the state level (which also depends on their
own performance, the more so the fewer the districts in the state), and also on their
personal performance relative to their party colleagues in the other districts of the same
state. For both types, election also depends on the assignment to safer versus more
competitive districts decided by the party leadership. In the Senate also the members
elected in the proportional tier have a strong attachment to their geographical district
and to their state, and are likely to have less obligations vis-a-vis their party leadership.
Electoral rule in the House In the House, 75% of the seats were allocated
according to plurality voting in 475 first-past-the-post single-member districts, while
the remaining 25% was allocated under proportional representation. Voters received
two ballots for the House: one to vote their preferred candidate in their single-member
district, and another to cast a vote for a party in the proportional tier. The 475
single-member districts were geographically contiguous ad-hoc districts comparable to
districts in the US House or in the UK House of Commons. In the proportional tier,
seats were allocated to parties according to the vote shares at the national level.7 The
seats won by each party in the proportional tier at the national level were distributed
to candidates in closed party lists across 26 multi-member districts (2 to 12 seats
per district). Most multi-member districts corresponded to a state, although larger
states were split in two or three. Politicians were forbidden to run in more than one
single-member district. However, they were allowed to contemporaneously run in one
single-member district in the majoritarian tier, and in one multi-member district in
the proportional tier. Candidates elected in both tiers were forced to accept the seat
in the majoritarian tier.8 Legislators elected in different tiers had arguably different
incentives and responsibilities in the eyes of the public opinion. Those elected in the
majoritarian tier were arguably perceived as the representative of their district, i.e.
of a specific geographic constituency. They owned their election to their personal
7Using the Hare-Niemeyer method.
8Gagliarducci et al. (2011) exploit this last feature for identification using a Regression Disconti-
nuity Design (RDD). Candidates running in both tiers were assigned to the majoritarian rather than
the proportional one based on the margin of victory in their single-member districts.
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performance in the district-level election. They also partly owned their election to
the party leaders, who decide which candidates to assign to safer or more competitive
districts. On the contrary, those elected in the proportional tier owned their seats only
to their position in the closed-list, that is decided by the party leadership.
3 Research question and empirical strategy
The aim of this paper is to test whether senators elected as district winners (majori-
tarian tier) behave differently from those elected among the runners-up (proportional
tier) under the electoral system in place for Italian Senate elections in 1994, 1996 and
2001. Existing evidence from mixed systems with completely separate tiers and ballots
(e.g. Italian House in the same period, German parliament, Scottish parliament) has
found that legislators elected in single-member districts focus their legislative activity
more to their constituents, shirk less (Gagliarducci et al., 2011), and are more likely
to enter committees crucial for targeted redistribution (Maaser and Stratmann, 2018)
than those elected in the proportional tier.
I hypothesize that these differences do not arise in the system analyzed here, be-
cause both types of senators own their election to their own performance in their
district, and because both go through the same election process, which involves the
same degree of visibility and attachment to a specific geographic constituency. I for-
mulate two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Senators elected as runners-up (proportional tier) do not carry out
less geographically targeted policies than those elected among first place finishers (ma-
joritarian tier).
Hypothesis 2: Senators elected as runners-up (proportional tier) do not extract more
rents than politicians elected among the first place finishers (majoritarian tier).
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3.1 Identification
The identification strategy is adapted from Gagliarducci et al. (2011). The sample
is composed of the universe of the elected senators. I define the treatment variable
Di equal to 1 if Senator i was elected as first-ranked in his district, and equal to 0
if he was elected as one of the runners-up. Treatment assignment depends on the
margin of victory Vi between candidate i and the winning candidate in his single-
member district. First of all, identification of causal effect of Di requires the standard
continuity assumption.






are continuous at the threshold Vi = 0.
Consider now the treatment assignment mechanism: Di = 1(Vi ≥ 0), where 1(.) is
the indicator function. The treatment assignment is more involved on the left side
of the threshold: if Vi < 0, we have either Di = 0 (if i was elected as runner-up),
or Di = . (if i was not elected). This treatment assignment mechanism asks for an
additional assumption. In particular, I must assume that in a left-neighborhood of
the threshold, senators elected as runners-up are a representative sample of the pop-
ulation of all candidates who did not rank first in their district. Let us define Ui the




E[Ui|Vi = v,Di = 0] = lim
v↑0
E[Ui|Vi = v,Di = . ].
To assess the credibility of this assumption, we must consider the mechanism that
assigns seats to runners-up. Conditional on Vi < 0, seat assignment to candidate i
hinges on two factors. First, on total votes earned by the candidates (excluding the
first-ranked) affiliated with the same party as i in the same state (including i himself)
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relative to those in other parties. This determines the number of seats, if any, assigned
to the party affiliated with i in his state. Second, seat assignment to i hinges on his
own performance relative to other runners-up in his own party in the same state. This
determines who gets the additional seats within each party, if any seat is available. In
other words, seat assignment to losers depends on the absolute vote share for candidate
i, which I define Wi, and on the electoral results in the other districts of the same state.
The variables Wi and Vi are correlated, but they are different as the margin victory also
depends on the vote share earned by the candidate with most votes in each district.
To see why, consider the simple example illustrated in Table 3, which reports vote
shares for an exemplar state that assigns two majoritarian seats to the Democrats,
and one proportional seat to the Republicans. Both Republican candidates have the
same margin of victory Vi (-10%), but different vote shares Wi (41% and 31%).
Table 3: Seat assignment to losers: example
Party District 1 District 2 Σlosers
Democrats 51 41 0
Republicans 41 31 72
Liberals 8 28 36
Total 100 100
VRepublican -10% -10%
Note: votes by party and district. VRepublican is the
margin of victory from the perspective of the Repub-
lican candidate. In bold candidates elected in the ma-
joritarian tier; in boxes candidates elected in the pro-
portional tier.
In general, conditional on the same negative margin of victory, candidates who earn
higher vote shares have more chances to be elected. Furthermore, we must also assume
that there are no spillovers across districts in the same state. In order words, candidate
i can not affect the results in other districts of the same state. The discussion in this
section highlights that Assumption LHS is not innocuous. However, I provide ample
evidence in support of its validity in section 4.1.
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3.2 Data
The dataset used by Gagliarducci et al. (2011) appears to be part of a larger research
project. The website of one of the authors makes available a dataset with information
on the Italian members of parliament from 1987 to 2008.9 I download the dataset
and restrict my attention to Senators elected between the XII and XIV legislatures
(elections in 1994, 1996 and 2001). Among others, I have access to the following
informations which I employ in the analysis: electoral-tier, district of election, vote
share, age, gender, number of kids, marital status, previous job, years of education,
state of residence, experience in local governments, party affiliation, details on bills
sponsorship and electronic parliament votes missed without any legitimate reason.
I construct the outcome variables as in Gagliarducci et al. (2011): the measure
of rent is the absenteeism rate; the measure of redistribution is the share of bills
targeted to the state of election over total bills proposed. The official classification of
the parliament is used to determine whether bills are geographically targeted or not.
Examples of geographically targeted bills are laws to protect ethnic minorities living
in a specific state, the creation of a national park, or of a new province. Examples of
general interest bills are reforms to the national welfare state or the national education
system. Both outcome variables are only available at the term level, and not year
by year. The summary statistics of the outcome variables are reported in Table 4;
summary statistics of the other variables used in the analysis including the running
variable are reported in Table 5.
Table 4: Summary statistics of outcome variables
Prop. Maj. ∆ Sample Obs. prop. Obs. maj.
Targeted bills 0.13 0.11 0.02 Full 247 694
Targeted bills 0.15 0.11 0.04∗∗ CCT 183 398
Absenteeism 0.49 0.35 0.14∗∗ Full 247 689
Absenteeism 0.48 0.38 0.10∗∗∗ CCT 132 236
Note: Targeted bills is the share of bills targeted to the state of election as a fraction of total
bills proposed over the term. Absenteeism is the fraction of electronic parliament votes missed
without any legitimate reason. CCT refers to the sample in the optimal bandwidth for local
linear regression selected using the algorithm by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b).
9http://www.tommasonannicini.eu/en/works/?category=datasets-experiments
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Table 5: Summary statistics of other variables
Proportional Majoritarian ∆
Margin of victory -8.78 12.35 -21.13∗∗∗
Vote share 34.41 45.37 -10.96∗∗∗
Age in years 53.49 54.39 -0.90
Male 0.89 0.92 -0.03
Married 0.83 0.82 0.01
Number of kids 1.81 1.75 0.07
Lawyer 0.15 0.13 0.02
Not resident in region 0.09 0.11 -0.02
Years of schooling 15.97 16.35 -0.37∗∗
Director 0.11 0.13 -0.02
Politician 0.04 0.03 0.01
Entrepreneur 0.09 0.09 0.00
Teacher 0.11 0.08 0.03
Self employed 0.10 0.09 0.01
Freshman 0.53 0.46 0.07∗
Physician 0.07 0.08 -0.01
Local government experience 0.64 0.56 0.08∗∗
Centre-right 0.52 0.53 -0.01
Majority status 0.30 0.58 -0.27∗∗∗
District in North 0.49 0.50 -0.00
Observations 247 691
Note: Full sample. Stars denote significance at the 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 level.
4 Estimation and findings
In this section, I assume that Assumptions RDD and LHS hold. Validity tests aimed
at supporting the credibility of the empirical strategy are presented in the next section.
For each of the two outcomes, I estimate the RD effect with linear local polynomial
estimator and triangular kernel using sixteen different bandwidths, including the opti-
mal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b). The smallest bandwidth
is half this optimal bandwidth, and the largest is double the optimal bandwidth. I
report graphically the point estimates alongside the 95% robust confidence intervals
by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b) as a function of the bandwidth (exact
figures at the optimal bandwith are reported in Table 6). I also report standard RD
graphs that plot local averages of the outcome variables in bins of the margin of vic-
tory, together with a third order global polynomial fitted separately on the two sides
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of the threshold. The bins are automatically selected using the MSE-optimal evenly
spaced method with spacings estimators by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a).
In Figure 1 the outcome variable is the absenteeism rate; in Figure 2 the outcome
variable is the share of targeted bills.




























Note: the outcome variable is the absenteeism rate. The left panel reports RD estimates and 95% robust confidence
interval plotted against the bandwidth used. Vertical red lines indicate the optimal bandwidth by Calonico et al.
(2014b). Estimation by linear local polynomial estimator with triangular kernel. The right panel plots local averages
of the outcome variables in bins of the margin of victory, along side a third order global polynomial fitted separately
on the two sides of the threshold. The bins are automatically selected using the IMSE-optimal evenly spaced method
using spacings estimators by Calonico et al. (2014a).
The estimated effect on absenteeism rate is not significantly different from zero at
the 95% level for any of the bandwidths considered (between 3 and 13). The point
estimate is 4.5 percentage points at the optimal bandwidth. The point estimates
are positive for small bandwidths and turn negative for large bandwidths. From the
graphical analysis, there is arguably no visible discontinuity at the threshold. In short,
there is no evidence that proportional members shirk at an higher rate relative to their
colleagues in the majoritarian tier, contrary to what found by Gagliarducci et al. (2011)
in the House.
The estimated effect on the share of targeted bills is negative and significantly
different from zero at the 90% level for all the bandwidths considered (between 6
and 23), and also the 95% level for large bandwidths (higher than 15). The size of
the effect is between -10 and -7 percentage points. At the optimal bandwidth, the
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Note: the outcome variable is the share of targeted bills. The left panel reports RD estimates and 95% robust
confidence interval plotted against the bandwidth used. Vertical red lines indicate the optimal bandwidth by Calonico
et al. (2014b). Estimation by linear local polynomial estimator with triangular kernel. The right panel plots local
averages of the outcome variables in bins of the margin of victory, along side a third order global polynomial fitted
separately on the two sides of the threshold. The bins are automatically selected using the IMSE-optimal evenly spaced
method using spacings estimators by Calonico et al. (2014a).
effect is -7 percentage points, which corresponds to a 45% decrease over the sample
mean calculated in the bandwidth to the left of the threshold. The RD plot shows
a downward jump in the estimated conditional expectation function at the threshold,
although the extent of the jump might be exaggerated by the polynomial specification.
A conservative way of interpreting these estimates is that there is no evidence of a
positive effect of being elected in the majoritarian tier, contrary to what estimated by
Gagliarducci et al. (2011) for the House. If anything, the effect is negative.
4.1 Validity tests
This section presents an array of exercises aimed at supporting the credibility of the
empirical strategy, as well as a battery of robustness tests.
Density test A standard validity test in RD studies is the McCrary (2008) den-
sity test to detect manipulation in the running variable. Applications to close election
are not particularly prone to problems of manipulation of the running variable, as all
candidates have strong incentives to win as many votes as possible. However, in our
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case the test is likely to detect a discontinuity in the density of the running variable.
The reason is that all the losers who did not get assigned a seat as best losers do not
appear in the sample. As such, many observations are missing from the distribution
of Vi on the left side of the threshold. Indeed, the test calculated on our sample de-
tects the expected break in the density function (left panel of Figure 3): the mass on
the right side of the threshold is larger than the mass on the left hand side. How to
check that this is indeed due to losers dropping out of the sample on the left-hand
side, rather than to special candidates sorting on the right hand side (for example
due to electoral fraud)? I have access to data on the vote shares of all the candidates
who ranked second in their district, but who did not get assigned a seat. Thus I can
re-introduce these vote shares in the distribution of Vi. The new distribution includes
the vote shares of all the first-ranked candidates, all the second-ranked candidates,
and all the candidates ranked below second who did get assigned a seat. As such, it
is likely that in a left-neighborhood of the threshold, very few candidates are missing.
When I estimate the McCrary (2008) density using the new distribution of Vi, the test
fails to detect any discontinuity at the threshold (right panel of Figure 3). As such,
there is no evidence of manipulation of the running variable.
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Note: estimates of density function of the margin of victory. The left panel is the density of the margin of victory in
the population of the elected senators. The right panel is the density of the margin of victory in the population of: all
first-ranked candidates; all second-ranked candidates; and all candidates ranked below the second place who received
a seat.
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Tests of Assumption LHS The discussion in Section 3.1 highlights why As-
sumption LHS may be violated. The key concern is that conditional on the same
negative value of the margin of victory, candidates with higher absolute vote share
are more likely to get assigned a seat. If this is empirically relevant, senators on the
left-hand side of the threshold, Di = 0, would have on average higher vote shares
than the candidates who did not get assigned a seat, Di = ., and assumption LHS
would be violated. This imbalance would imply that the vote share should exhibit a
discontinuity at the threshold Vi = 0. We can test if this is the case using the same RD
specification as in the baseline and the vote share as outcome variable. Reassuringly,
I find no evidence of such a discontinuity, as apparent from the estimates in Figure 4.




































Note: the outcome variable is the absolute vote share; the running variable is the margin of victory. The left panel
reports RD estimates and 95% robust confidence interval plotted against the bandwidth used. Vertical red lines indicate
the optimal bandwidth by Calonico et al. (2014b). Estimation by linear local polynomial estimator with triangular
kernel. The right panel plots local averages of the outcome variables in bins of the margin of victory, along side a third
order global polynomial fitted separately on the two sides of the threshold. The bins are automatically selected using
the IMSE-optimal evenly spaced method using spacings estimators by Calonico et al. (2014a).
As an additional robustness check, I re-estimate the RD effect controlling also for
the vote share (not only for the margin of victory). Figure 5 reports point estimates
and 95% robust confidence interval: in black from the model without controlling for
the vote share Wi, in red from the model with it. The results for absenteeism rate (left)
and share of targeted bills (right) are virtually identical with or without controlling
for the vote share.
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Bandwidth
Note: on the left the outcome is the absenteeism rate, on the right the share of targeted bills. Both panels reports RD
estimates and 95% robust confidence interval plotted against the bandwidth used: in black from the model without
controlling for vote share; in red from the model controlling for vote share. Vertical red lines indicate the optimal
bandwidth by Calonico et al. (2014b). Estimation by linear local polynomial estimator with triangular kernel.
Finally, consider the following. Assumption RD implies that in a neighborhood of
Vi = 0 unobservables are balanced across three groups of observations: Di = 1, Di = 0,
and Di = . . If Assumption LHS is violated, in a neighborhood of Vi = 0 unobservables
are not balanced across the two groups Di = 0, and Di = . . Thus, as already noticed
by Gagliarducci et al. (2011), Assumption RDD and Assumption LHS “are jointly
verified if and only if politicians’ observables and unobservables characteristics are
balanced around the threshold”. As such, standard tests used in the RD literature to
assess the validity of Assumption RDD can be also used to assess the overall validity
of the present empirical strategy.
Covariates imbalances In light of the discussion above, I test whether pre-
determined covariates are imbalanced across the threshold. In particular, I estimate
the RD effect with the baseline estimation strategy using a number of predetermined
covariates as outcome variable. Failure to find systematic differences in covariates en-
hances the credibility of the empirical exercise. I consider the following covariates: age,
number of kids, years of schooling; dummies for: married, lawyer, state of election dif-
ferent from state of residence, director, professional politician, entrepreneur, teacher,
18
self-employed, freshman, physician, local government experience, centre-right, major-
ity status, district in the North. Most of these estimates are not significantly different
from zero at the 95% level (Figure 6).
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District in North
Note: Several predetermined covariates as outcome variables. RD estimates and 95% robust confidence interval plotted
against the bandwidth used. Vertical red lines indicate the optimal bandwidth by Calonico et al. (2014b). Estimation
by linear local polynomial estimator with triangular kernel.
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Finally, I also estimate the RD effect on the two outcome variables of interest
controlling for all the covariates listed above. Figure 7 reports point estimates and 95%
robust confidence interval: in black from the model without controlling for covariates,
in red from the model with covariates. The estimates of the effect on absenteeism
rate (left panel) are similar with or without covariates. The confidence intervals are
tighter, but always include the zero. When controlling for covariates, the RD effect on
targeted bills (right panel) is closer to zero by approximately 2.5 percentage points,
compared to the estimates without covariates. The estimates are never significant at
the 95% level. Thus there is no robust evidence of a negative effect of the treatment
on the share of targeted bills.
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Bandwidth
Note: on the left the outcome is the absenteeism rate, on the right the share of targeted bills. Both panels reports RD
estimates and 95% robust confidence interval plotted against the bandwidth used: in black from the model without
controlling for covariates; in red from the model controlling for covariates. Vertical red lines indicate the optimal
bandwidth by Calonico et al. (2014b). Estimation by linear local polynomial estimator with triangular kernel.
Controlling for district-election fixed effects The electoral rule in the Senate
is such that some districts elect only one senator (the first-ranked), others more than
one (the first-ranked and one or more best losers). Senators elected as first may behave
differently if they are the unique representative of their district, or if instead some of
their competitors are elected as well. In this section, I account for this by re-estimating
the RD effect by OLS in bandwidths of different size, controlling for district-election
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fixed effects.10 This specification,
Yijt = βDijt + γVijt + δ Vijt × 1(Vijt > 0) + FEjt + εijt, (1)
will compare majoritarian senators to the proportional senators elected in the same
district j and in the same election t. Thus those senators who are the unique repre-
sentative in their district do not contribute to the identifying variation. The estimates
from this specification (red lines in Figure 8) are quite similar to the model without
controls (black lines in the same figure). None of the new estimates are significant at
the 95% level for any of the two outcomes.
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Bandwidth
Note: on the left the outcome is the absenteeism rate, on the right the share of targeted bills. Both panels reports RD
estimates and 95% confidence interval plotted against the bandwidth used: in black from the model without controlling
for district-election fixed effects; in red from the model including these fixed effects. Vertical red lines indicate the
optimal bandwidth by Calonico et al. (2014b). Estimation by OLS, and robust standard errors.
Finally, I combine all the previous validity tests together. In particular, I estimate
by OLS in different bandwidths the following equation
Yijt = βDijt + γVijt + δVijt × 1(Vijt > 0) + λXijt + FEjt + εijt (2)
where Xijt include all the available covariates including the vote share. These conser-
vatives estimates (red lines in Figure 9) are not too dissimilar from the model without
10I turn to OLS to be able to include the fixed effects.
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controls, and are never significant at the 95% level.
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Bandwidth
Note: on the left the outcome is the absenteeism rate, on the right the share of targeted bills. Both panels reports RD
estimates and 95% confidence interval plotted against the bandwidth used: in black from the model without additional
controls; in red from the model with additional controls. Vertical red lines indicate the optimal bandwidth by Calonico
et al. (2014b). Estimation by OLS, and robust standard errors.
Table 6 summarizes point estimates from all models and specifications presented
thus far, restricting the attention to the optimal bandwidth. Overall, there is no
evidence that senators elected in the proportional tier target less their district of
election, nor that they shirk more, compared to their colleagues in the other tier.
Table 6: RD effects at the optimal CCT bandwidth, different models.
Outcome: absenteeism rate
Estimation Bandwidth Controls Effect 95% C.I. S.E. p-value Obs.
LLP triangular 6.4 - 0.04 -0.09; +0.23 - 0.38 368
LLP triangular 6.4 vote share 0.04 -0.1; +0.22 - 0.43 368
LLP triangular 6.4 individual controls 0.05 -0.04; +0.15 - 0.25 348
OLS 6.4 district-year FE -0.06 -0.28; +0.16 0.08 0.58 368
OLS 6.4 all the above 0.05 -0.1; +0.2 0.11 0.54 353
Outcome: share of targeted bills
Estimation Bandwidth Controls Effect 95% C.I. S.E. p-value Obs.
LLP triangular 11.5 - -0.07 -0.16; +0.01 - 0.08 581
LLP triangular 11.5 vote share -0.07 -0.16; +0.01 - 0.09 581
LLP triangular 11.5 individual controls -0.04 -0.12; +0.03 - 0.22 557
OLS 11.5 district-year FE -0.04 -0.13; +0.03 0.04 0.26 581
OLS 11.5 all the above -0.04 -0.11; +0.03 0.04 0.31 557
Note: the table reports figures referring to the estimates at the optimal CCT bandwitdh; these results
are also reported graphically elsewhere in the paper. Individual controls include: age, number of kids,
years of schooling; dummies for: married, lawyer, state of election different from state of residence, direc-
tor, professional politician, entrepreneur, teacher, self-employed, freshman, physician, local government
experience, centre-right, majority status, district in the North.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has discussed the salient features of the mixed electoral system in place
for Senatorial elections in Italy in 1994, 1996 and 2001. Under this system, most
seats are assigned in first-past-the-post districts. The remaining seats are assigned
to the most voted runners-up proportionally to the vote shares of their parties. As
such this system mitigates a classic tradeoff between majoritarian and proportional
systems: it improves representation, while keeping all legislators equally accountable
to a well-defined geographical constituency.
A regression discontinuity design based on close elections has confirmed the latter
insight. There is no evidence that senators elected in the proportional tier (runners-
up) exhert less legislative effort targeted to their district, nor that they shirk more,
compared to their colleagues elected in the majoritarian tier (first place finishers).
Taken together, the evidence is informative for policy-makers interested in design-
ing an electoral system that results in quasi proportional representation of parties
in parliament, while keeping all its members equally accountable to their local con-
stituency. The latter feature has important implications for the distribution of public
expenditure across space and items, and for incentivizing politicians to behave in the
interest of their voters.
The analysis presented here is purely positive. A welfare comparison of adopting
the system under investigation instead of other systems is beyond the scope of this
paper, and could be subject of future research.
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